
























In this paper we develop a coherent framework that integrates both traditional 
measures of β-convergence and σ-convergence within a study of cross-country 
income dynamics. To do this we exploit the close links that exist between studies of   
income convergence and studies analysing the progressivity of the tax system. Our 
framework offers a simple algebraic decomposition of σ-convergence as the 
combined effect of β-convergence and leapfrogging among countries. We illustrate 
our approach using data for the period 1960-2000. 
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1. Introduction 
  The degree to which income or productivity levels have converged across 
countries, over time, has been the subject of extensive research. Initial studies tended 
to be descriptive - highlighting the key trends in inequality over time (Abramovitz 
(1986), Baumol (1986)). However, in recent years this work has become more closely 
connected with research in economic growth theory. Two theories have come to 
dominate the literature on economic growth. The traditional Solow growth model 
(Solow (1956)) predicts that countries that are furthest away from their steady states 
will grow more quickly than countries closer to their steady state. For countries with 
the same steady state this implies that incomes will converge along the transition path. 
In contrast endogenous growth models (Romer (1986)) can generate patterns of 
growth that do not exhibit any tendency towards convergence.
1 Initially it was 
suggested that the presence or otherwise of convergence could form the basis of a test 
of the neo-classical growth model against the more recent endogenous growth models. 
As a result, several papers were written examining the nature of the convergence 
process (e.g Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992)). As a 
consequence of this work however, there has been much controversy, debate and 
confusion regarding how to measure and interpret income convergence.  
The dominant approach in the early literature is characterised by the work of 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). This involves regressing income growth rates on 
initial income to test whether poor countries grow faster than rich countries.
2 
However, several authors (Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993)) have argued that these 
regressions detect mobility within a distribution but tell us little about whether income 
dispersion across countries has fallen: it is possible to observe poor countries growing 
faster than rich countries and yet for incomes to diverge. For this to happen it must be 
the case that the initially poorer countries overtake/leapfrog the richer countries, so 
                                                           
1 The key distinction between these two models is the presence or otherwise of diminishing returns to 
capital. For a more detailed discussion of alternative growth models and  their implications for the 
evolution of the international distribution of income see de la Fuente (1997).  
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Values of β<0 are taken as evidence of convergence. In practice a non-linear version of this equation 
may be estimated but this makes little difference to the final results. It can be easily shown that -β 
measures how rapidly an economy’s output approaches its steady state.     2
that the rankings of countries are reversed.
3 To distinguish between these different 
forms of convergence Sala-i-Martin (1996a) coined the term β-convergence to capture 
situations where “poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones.”
 4 The term σ-
convergence is defined as follows: “a group of economies are converging, in the 
sense of σ, if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over 
time.” While Friedman (1992) has argued that the real test of convergence should 
focus on the consistent diminution of variance among countries, Sala-i-Martin 
(1996a,b) argues that both concepts of convergence are interesting and should be 
analysed empirically.  
In this paper we establish the close links that exist between existing measures 
of  β-convergence and measures of tax progression used in the public economics 
literature. We exploit this relationship to develop a framework for studying realised 
income dynamics. This new approach incorporates the traditional measures of 
convergence in a coherent way. We measure σ-convergence as the change in the Gini 
coefficient over time and examine its components using the exact additive 
decomposition suggested by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2003). By analogy to the tax 
progression and income mobility literature, the two components of the decomposition 
can be interpreted as the contribution of β-convergence and leapfrogging to overall σ-
convergence. Our framework reveals more about income dynamics than studies based 
only on regression coefficients or correlation coefficients, yet is less demanding than 
full-scale estimation of the joint income distribution. Since our approach can also 
incorporate varying degrees of inequality aversion when measuring dispersion, it 
allows us to use a family of dispersion measures when studying convergence. This 
permits a robust analysis of income convergence across a range of variability 
measures. To illustrate our approach we examine income dynamics across countries 
from 1960-2000. 
 
2.Decomposing Inequality:  
σ-convergence, Progressivity, Reranking, β-convergence and Leapfrogging. 
                                                           
3 Tamura (1992), Brezis et al (1993) and  Sugimoto (2003) present examples of growth models in 
which leapfrogging/overtaking occurs. Tamura (1992) and Sugimoto (2003) emphasise the role of 
inequality within countries in generating differential growth paths, while Brezis et al (1993) focus on 
the disadvantage of leading countries in adopting new technologies.  
4 In that paper Sala-i-Martin dates the first use of this term to his Ph.D thesis in 1990.   3
Previous studies of cross-country income dispersion have tended to use either 
the coefficient of variation of GDP (e.g Friedman (1992)) or the standard deviation of 
log GDP (e.g Sala-i-Martin (1996a)) to summarise income inequality. In this paper we 
focus instead on the Gini coefficient.
5 The Gini coefficient measures twice the area 
between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz Curve, Lx(p), and has been used 
extensively in the public economics literature dealing with taxation and income 
redistribution issues.
6 In this paper we adapt the framework developed in the public 
economics literature so as to study the dynamics of income inequality across 
countries. To do this we must first define the concentration curve for Z (with respect 




z(p) plots the cumulative shares of Z against 
quantiles in the X-distribution. It is important to note that CC
x
z(p) will differ from 
Lz(p) in situations where the rankings of individuals based on X and Z differ. In the 
same way as the Gini-coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve, we can also define 
an area based measure of the extent to which the concentration curve deviates from 
the 45-degree line. This is known as the Concentration coefficient C
x
z.  
We can now view any change in inequality as a two-step process. To see this 
let Xi denote income of country i in period 1 and Yi denote income in period 2; 
formally Yi=Xi(1+gi), where gi measures the income growth rate for country i. We 
define a growth process to be progressive if the growth rate gi is decreasing with 
income; regressive if gi increases with income; and proportional if gi is constant 
across income levels.
7 The change in the Gini coefficient over time can be 
decomposed as follows: 
∆G=GY -GX  =( GY  - C
X
Y ) – (GX -C
X
Y)=R-P 
The first term uses only the final distribution of income and measures the 
increase in inequality due to reranking. The second term measures the redistributive 
impact of progressivity using only the rankings from the initial income distribution. In 
the tax literature this term is often referred to as the Reynolds-Smolensky index of 
vertical equity. It is proportional to the Kakwani measure of tax progressivity. It is 
                                                           
5 For a comparison of alternative measures of inequality see Cowell (1995). For studies using Lorenz 
Curves and Gini coefficients to study regional income convergence in the U.S. see Bishop et al (1992, 
1994). 
6 For a detailed discussion of these issues see Lambert (1993). 
7 This terminology differs slightly from that used in the tax-benefit literature (see Lambert (1993) page 
250). In that literature benefits are said to be distributed regressively if the benefit rate declines with 
income. This implies that a regressive benefit system exerts an equalising effect on the income 
distribution. We prefer to use the term progressive to describe the analogous situation in the growth 
context.   4
easily shown that P will equal zero if the growth rate is proportional. P is positive if 
the growth process is progressive; a factor leading to lower inequality over time. In 
contrast, P is negative if the growth process is regressive; a factor tending to increase 
inequality. The more progressive is the growth process, the greater the value of P and 
hence the larger the reduction in inequality. Viewing the change in inequality in this 
way allows us to identify the relative contribution of both re-ranking and progressive 
growth to the overall change in inequality, ∆G.  The decomposition can be easily 
generalised to settings that use the generalised S-Gini coefficient (Gx(v)).
8 This 
coefficient allows the researcher to incorporate a parameter of inequality aversion, v, 
when calculating the summary measure of dispersion. Intuitively the S-Gini allows for 
different weights to be attached to different income ranges when integrating over the 
Lorenz curve.  
The parallel between our presentation of income dynamics and the existing 
work on income convergence across countries is immediate.
9 ∆G denotes the change 
in income dispersion over time and is therefore a direct measure of σ-convergence. 
The progressivity term, -P(v), captures the extent to which income inequality is 
reduced over time as a result of higher growth rates among lower income countries: it 
is a measure “pro-poor income growth”. Expressed in this way it becomes obvious 
that β-convergence, defined as situation where “poor economies tend to grow faster 
than rich ones”, is nothing more than progressive (or “pro-poor”) income growth. As 
a result, the progressivity term in our decomposition measures the contribution of β-
convergence  to the overall reduction in income dispersion. The other term in the 
decomposition measures the negative impact of positional mobility on income 
inequality. In the growth context this captures the notion of leapfrogging or reranking. 
We can use Figures 1-5 to illustrate our decomposition. These figures give a 
sample of the range of income dynamics that are easily captured using our framework. 
Figures 1 and 2 both illustrate situations where β-convergence and σ-convergence 
coexist. In the first situation there is no leapfrogging. In our approach the σ-
convergence would be captured by a fall in the Gini coefficient. For this example all 
of this reduction would be attributed to the progressivity of income growth, so that 
∆G=-P. The absence of reranking would be reflected in a measure of R=0. In the 
                                                           
8 For a more detailed discussion see Donaldson and Weymark (1980).   5
second example incomes converge despite rereanking. This would be captured in our 
framework by values of P and R such that P>0, R>0 and P>R, highlighting the 
dominant role of pro-poor income growth or β-convergence in reducing inequality.  
Figures 3 and 4 both illustrate situations where there is no σ-convergence 
(∆G=0). In the example in Figure 3, however, poor countries grow faster than rich 
countries so that we have substantial β-convergence. This is masked in the overall 
inequality figure by the complete reranking of the two countries. Our approach will 
identify the redistributive contribution of β-convergence to inequality in these data 
but this will be entirely offset by the contribution of the leapfrogging component, so 
that P=R>0. Not only does our framework identify the tendency of poor countries to 
grow faster but it also simultaneously quantifies the extent to which this is offset by 
reranking in the data. In contrast, Figure 4 illustrates another process for which there 
is no σ-convergence. However, this case differs from that in Figure 3 in that this new 
process is static. Again ∆G=0, but for this process our decomposition would result in 
P=R=0. Our decomposition would identify this as a growth process without either β-
convergence or leapfrogging.  
There are theoretical reasons as to why one might wish to distinguish between 
the examples in Figures 3 and 4. The steady state in a Solow Growth model is 
characterised by a constant dispersion in income. In a stochastic version of the model 
this dispersion need not be zero; random shocks may have effects on countries even in 
the steady state. However, as noted by de la Fuente (1997), “Such disturbances will 
only have transitory effects, implying that in the long-run we should observe a fluid 
distribution in which relative positions of the different countries change rapidly (page 
36).” Thus the steady state dynamics should correspond to Figure 3 rather than Figure 
4. Our framework provides a straightforward way of distinguishing between these 
processes. Finally, Figure 5 illustrates a situation where we have β-convergence and 
σ-divergence. Here the effect of the leapfrogging induced by the pro-poor income 
growth more than offsets the reduction in inequality arising from β-convergence. In 
this case we have ∆G >0, P>0, R>0 and R>P.  
These examples also help clarify an important point; Sala-i-Martin (1996b) 
begins his paper by defining β-convergence in the traditional way, noting that “there 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Recent papers by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2003) use similar concepts to 
study individual income mobility.   6
is β-convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones.” However, 
later in the paper he suggests that β-convergence studies the mobility of income 
within the same distribution. As a result, some researchers (Boyle and McCarthy 
(1997)) have drawn parallels between β-convergence and measures of rank mobility: 
defining indices of rank concordance as direct measures of β-convergence. Clearly for 
a distribution to exhibit β-convergence, without σ-convergence, it must be the case 
that countries are changing ranks (Figure 3). However, as Figure 1 shows, it is 
possible to have β-convergence without any positional mobility; it is also possible to 
have rank mobility without β-convergence. The definition of β-convergence simply 
requires poor countries to grow faster than rich countries, irrespective of whether or 
not there is leapfrogging. Both a Barro-regression approach and our redistributive 
approach would indicate a strong role for β-convergence for the process illustrated in 
Figure 1; measures based on rank correlations would not. While the issue of positional 
mobility is interesting, it is captured by our measure R; this in turn measures 
reranking/leapfrogging and not progressivity/β-convergence.  
Quah (1996) uses diagrams similar to these to argue that neither β-
convergence nor σ-convergence deliver a convincing description of the dynamics of 
evolving distributions. Quah (1996) proposes an alternative procedure based on 
estimation of stochastic Kernels; our analysis builds upon established work in public 
economics to offer a coherent alternative to Quah’s approach. Our framework 
integrates the three important features of the convergence process: σ-convergence; β-
convergence and leapfrogging, in a way that is easy to implement and interpret. The 
next section provides an empirical illustration of this approach. We apply our 
decomposition to data on cross-country income dynamics taken from the latest release 
of the Penn-World tables.  
 
3: Data and Results 
 
3.1 Data 
In this section of the paper we analyse income convergence between 1960 and 
2000, using data from the latest version of the Penn-World Tables.
10 The Penn World 
Tables provide price adjusted income measures for 168 countries for the years 1950-
                                                           
10 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.   7
2000 and have been used extensively in previous studies of convergence. In this paper 
we use data for a sample of 98 countries that provide complete data over the period 
1960-2000. We also look at income dynamics for a restricted set of 25 OECD   
countries. Income is measured as real per-capita gross domestic product in 1996 
international prices. The countries used in our analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 
2.  
Figures 6 and 7 provide a useful graphical summary of the evolution of 
income inequality over the period 1962-1998. Figure 6 summarises the data for the 
OECD sample, while Figure 7 provides the results for the full sample. We focus first 
on the OECD countries.  For the purpose of constructing this graph we used a 5-year 
moving average of incomes; the income for 1962 is thus an average of that country’s 
income from 1960-1964; likewise income in 1998 is an average of incomes from 
1996-2000. Incomes are expressed relative to the overall mean for that year; values 
above 1 correspond to high-income countries and values below 1 represent low-
income countries. The North East  (NE) and South West (SW) quadrants of Figure 6 
are simple transformations of the empirical distribution functions of incomes in the 
two periods; they establish a relationship between income and rank in each of the two 
years. The estimated (non-linear) line in the North West (NW) quadrant maps the 
relationship between incomes in these two marginal distributions. The y-coordinate of 
this line shows the income a country would have expected to receive in 1998, 
predicted using their initial 1962 income. The 45-degree line corresponds to a 
situation of proportional income growth. More formally we can show that our 
progressivity measure, P, is a weighted integral of the individual differences of each 
country point to the 45-degree line (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2003). The graph shows 
that countries with low initial incomes would have expected their income to rise 
fastest over this period. This is a simple graphical presentation of the tendency 
towards β-convergence that occurred for the OECD countries over this time period.  
The South East (SE) captures the extent of leapfrogging. Deviations from the 
45-degree line in this quadrant show the extent of re-ranking; countries above the 45- 
degree have increased their rank over time and vice versa. The results show that 
almost every country changed rank over this period; countries such as Ireland, Japan 
and Norway moved up the distribution; countries such as Sweden, New Zealand and 
Britain moved down. There is no immediate mapping from this graphical presentation   8
of leapfrogging to our summary measure R; the easiest way to visualise the impact of 
leapfrogging on relative incomes is to look at the nature and composition of income 
clusters in both years. Looking at the NW quadrant for 1962 (along the horizontal 
axis) we can identify approximately 3 clusters of countries: a low-income cluster 
consisting of Korea, Turkey, Mexico, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Japan and Ireland; a 
high-income cluster involving Luxembourg, USA and Switzerland; and a cluster of 
middle-income countries made up of the remaining OECD members. Switching axis 
to look at 1998, there still appears to be a low income, middle-income and high-
income cluster; furthermore, our graph allows us to look at compositional changes 
within and between these clusters. We notice that Switzerland has fallen out of the 
high-income group into the middle-group; New Zealand, which was initially at the 
upper end of the middle-income group, is now at the lower end of this group; the big 
movers out of the low-income group were Ireland and Japan, who have now joined 
the middle-income countries.  
Figure 7 provides the same analysis for the full sample of 98 countries. The 
growth in relative incomes for this sample tends to be concentrated in the middle of 
the distribution, with relative incomes at the very top of the distribution falling 
Although identifying individual countries becomes more difficult, it is apparent that 
much of the leapfrogging that occurred over this time period resulted in countries 
changing positions within groups; relatively few countries changed groups. In the next 
section we use the decomposition presented earlier to look at these changes more 
formally. 
 
3.2 σ-convergence, β-convergence and leapfrogging 1960-2000. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Tables 3-6. Tables 3 and 5 refer to 
the OECD sample, while Tables 4 and 6 refer to the full sample. Table 3 reports the 
Generalised Gini coefficient for the set of OECD countries, at 10-year intervals, for 
the period 1960-2000. We report the Gini for three values of the inequality aversion 
parameter equal to 1.5, 2, 2.5, respectively; the first places relatively more weight on 
incomes at the top of the distribution; the second corresponds to the regular Gini-
coefficient; the third gives relatively more weight to inequality at the low end of the 
distribution. For completeness we also report the standard deviation of log income. 
The overall trend is similar for all four measures and indicates a substantial reduction   9
of income dispersion over the period 1960-2000. For each measure the majority of 
this reduction took place between 1960 and 1980; convergence slowed down 
significantly after this period.
11 How we interpret the trend in the last 20 years 
depends on the relative weight given to inequality at the top end of the distribution; 
when we place more weight on income differences at the top end of the distribution 
we find that inequality increased substantially in the last 10 years; in fact according to 
this measure inequality in 2000 is higher than it was in 1980.
12 In contrast, when we 
place more weight on inequality at the low end of the distribution we find that, despite 
a slowdown in convergence, inequality continued to decline in recent years. These 
contrasting results suggest that the slowdown in income convergence over this period 
is driven by a small number of the richest countries pulling away from the rest of the 
distribution; as a result the income share of the wealthiest countries has increased 
substantially. All the measures used in Table 4 confirm what has been established in 
many previous studies; for the world as a whole, incomes diverged substantially over 
this period. 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 decompose these changes in income inequality 
using the framework outlined in section 2. This approach allows us to determine the 
redistributive impact of income growth for both samples. The results are provided for 
the traditional Gini coefficient. The rows of the tables refer to different time periods, 
while the columns refer to the various components of the convergence process; the 
first column shows the change in the Gini coefficient and measures σ-convergence; 
the second and third columns present the respective contributions of progressive 
income growth (β-convergence) and reranking (leapfrogging) to the change in overall 
inequality.
13 The final column reports the traditional measure of β-convergence 
derived from a Barro-regression. 
                                                           
11 This slowdown in convergence among developed countries was discussed in O’Neill (1996). The 
analysis in that paper suggests that the slowdown may be related to changes in the rate of human 
capital accumulation. 
12  This is not evident in Figure 6, which plots the evolution of income inequality over the entire 40 
years. However if we repeat the analysis for the same sub-periods as reported in Table 1, the same 
trend of rising relative income at the very top of the distribution between 1978-88 and 1988-1998 
becomes apparent. In the interests of brevity we have omitted the graphical summary for each of the 
sub-periods, though these are available from the authors upon request. 
13 The standard errors on the decomposition terms were constructed using a bootstrap procedure with 
1000 replications. These estimates are similar in magnitude to the approximate analytic standard errors 
constructed using Jean-Yves Duclos's DAD software http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/~jyves/index.html. 
   10
Looking at the results in Table 5 we see that leapfrogging plays only a minor 
role in the cross-country income dynamics of OECD countries; re-ranking did very 
little to offset the reduction in inequality induced by β-convergence between 1960 and 
1980.
14 Furthermore, we see that the stable income distribution observed over the last 
10 years reflects a static distribution; neither leapfrogging nor β-convergence 
contribute anything to changes in income dispersion across countries over this period. 
The last column presents our estimates of the traditional measure of β-convergence 
from growth regressions; the results are reported so that a negative β indicates 
convergence. For the most part these results are consistent with our earlier analysis; 
the early periods are characterised by significant β-convergence; this is absent in the 
later years. However, it is worthwhile making two observations: Firstly, in every 
period under consideration we observe both leapfrogging and values of |β|<1; 
therefore, we need to be careful when interpreting claims that |β|<1 rules out 
leapfrogging; this applies only to “deterministic” leapfrogging, where poor economies 
are systematically predicted to get ahead of rich economies; a value of |β|<1 says 
nothing about positional mobility in general. In theory it is possible to extend our 
decomposition to distinguish between systematic leapfrogging and stochastic 
leapfrogging using the procedures outlined by Duclos et al (2003); however this 
requires a reliable estimate of the growth schedule. Given the small number of 
observations in our samples this is likely to prove difficult. As a result we did not 
attempt to distinguish between different sources of re-ranking in our analysis. 
Secondly, it is interesting to compare the full period from 1960-2000, with that from 
1980-1990; for both these periods the estimated β coefficient from the growth 
equations are almost identical. However, when you look at columns 2 and 3 we see 
that, for the two periods in question, the dynamics underlying the income distribution 
were substantially different. For the overall period progressive income growth had a 
significant redistributive effect; as a result income inequality declined substantially. In 
the later period, however, total income inequality did not change. Furthermore our 
decomposition shows that neither leapfrogging nor β-convergence was important over 
this period; as a result effective β-convergence fell substantially over this period. 
                                                           
14 Using measures of rank correlations Boyle and McCarthy (1997) also concluded that “positional 
mobility” was relatively unimportant over this time. However, our approach differs in two ways; firstly 
we can determine precisely the contribution of this component to income dynamics; secondly we do 
not equate positional mobility with β-convergence.   11
Relying on Barro-regressions to identify β-convergence would miss these differences. 
Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) make a similar point in a different context; they note 
that tax schedules with similar measures of structural progression can differ 
substantially in their effective redistribution. Therefore, even if we accept the 
seemingly well-established tendency for Barro-regressions to return a rate of 
convergence of 2% over a wide range of different examples, our framework shows 
how the redistributive effects of these processes may differ substantially.
15 
Table 5 presents the results for the world as a whole. In contrast to the OECD 
sample we find little evidence of  β-convergence; for almost every period considered 
the regressive nature of income growth and any observed leapfrogging combined to 
increase income dispersion. When the full 40-year period is considered we see that 
leapfrogging was the dominant force driving income dynamics; this at a time when 
the redistributive effect of growth was regressive. Again the results are, for the most 
part, consistent with the traditional Barro-regression; however, again we see the 
potential for processes with similar coefficients from the Barro-regression (1970-80 
and 1980-1990) may be associated with somewhat different levels of effective 
redistribution. 
 
3.3 Conditional β-Convergence 
  Following Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995) we can adapt our framework to deal with distinctions between absolute β-
convergence and conditional β-convergence. The analysis presented earlier focused 
on whether or not poor countries grew faster than richer countries; this concept has 
been labelled as absolute β-convergence in the growth literature. However, it is well 
known that models such as the Solow growth model do not necessarily predict 
absolute β-convergence; instead, it predicts that countries that are further away from 
their steady states will grow faster than countries closer to their steady state. In the 
event that all countries share the same steady state this will manifest itself in poorer 
countries growing more quickly; however, if we allow countries to have different 
steady states this is no longer the case; instead, we must modify our approach to 
consider  conditional  β-convergence: conditional convergence examines the 
                                                           
15 See Quah (1996) for a critical analysis of the uniformity of convergence rates across different 
samples and time-frames.   12
relationship between growth and initial income after controlling for differences in 
steady state incomes.  
The traditional test for conditional β-convergence involves regressing growth 
on initial income, holding constant a number of additional variables that determine 
steady state income; if the partial correlation between growth and income is negative 
we say that the data exhibit conditional β-convergence. Such a distinction may not be 
important among groups of countries that are relatively homogenous, such as those 
members of the OECD. However, a number of researchers have shown that this 
distinction can be important when looking at more heterogeneous sets of countries. 
With this in mind we modify our approach so as to examine the importance of 
conditional β-convergence for the full sample of countries in our study. To partial-out 
differences in steady state incomes across countries we run the following regression 
for each year in the sample: 
 
RGDPi=α+δ1 SKi+ δ2ni+εi 
 
where RGDPi is real GDP per capita for country I; SKi is the average share of 
real investment in real GDP for country i over full sample period; and ni is the 
average rate of growth of the working age population for country i. The savings rate 
and the population growth rate are key determinants of steady state incomes in 
exogenous growth models; using the residuals from the above regression as a measure 
of income should eliminate much of the heterogeneity arising from differences in 
steady state incomes.
16 Having obtained the residuals for each country and each year, 
we rescale the annual residuals so as to have the same mean as the raw GDP series for 
that year
17; these rescaled residuals are then used to examine income convergence 
using the framework outlined in section 2. The results are presented in Table 7; the 
                                                           
16 Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992) use a similar approach in their regression analysis of conditional 
convergence.  
17 It is necessary to rescale the residuals before applying our framework since the raw residuals have a 
mean zero; as a result the Gini coefficient is not defined for the raw residual series. Formally the Gini 







j i ∑∑ −
= . Rescaling the residuals, as we have, ensures that 
the differences between the estimated Gini for the raw and residualised GDP series reflects only 
differences in the average absolute deviations of both series.  This seems a reasonable way to proceed.   13
contribution of the re-ranking component (column 4) does not change much when we 
move from absolute to conditional convergence; however, in keeping with earlier 
work, we now find evidence of substantial conditional β-convergence; this is true 
with either the traditional Barro measure of convergence or our measure of effective 
convergence; the latter focuses directly on the redistributive impact of progressive 
income growth. Although, there is some evidence that leapfrogging partly offset the 
effect of β-convergence on overall income dispersion, especially when we take a 40 
year horizon, the net effect is still largely determined by the level of β-convergence. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper are consistent with earlier studies that have 
examined inequality across countries. However, we believe that the approach adopted 
in our paper represents a significant development in the analysis of cross-country 
income dynamics; the techniques we use allow us to “marry” the approaches 
advocated by Friedman and Quah, with those suggested by Barro and Sala-I-Martin. 
In doing so we develop a coherent integrated framework involving concepts that, up 
to now, have often been viewed as competitors in the analysis of income dynamics. 
To do this we adapt concepts originally developed to study the progressivity of the tax 
system and apply them to study cross-country income dynamics; doing so provides a 
simple integrated framework for studying income dynamics. This framework allows 
us to easily evaluate and understand the connections between the various sources of 
convergence discussed in the literature. Our results suggest that, for almost all of the 
samples and time-periods where β-convergence occurred, the presence of 
leapfrogging did little to offset the reduction in overall dispersion induced by β-
convergence; when both processes occurred the net effect was largely determined by 
the level of β-convergence. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
However we note that different rescaling constants will led to different values for both the residualised 
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Table 1: Full Sample of 98 countries included in the analysis 
 
Argentina Costa  Rica  India  Malawi  Sweden 
Australia Denmark Ireland  Malaysia Switzerland 
Austria Dominican 
Republic 
Iran Niger  Seychelles 
Burundi  Algeria Iceland Nigeria Syria 
Belgium Ecuador Israel  Nicaragua  Chad 
Benin Egypt Italy  Netherlands  Togo 
Burkina  Faso  Ethiopia Jamaica Norway Thailand 
Bangladesh Finland  Jordan  Nepal  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
Bolivia France  Japan  New  Zealand  Turkey 
Brazil Gabon  Kenya Pakistan  Tanzania 
Barbados Ghana  Korea  Panama  United 
Kingdom 
Canada Guinea Sri  Lanka  Peru  Uganda 
Chile Gambia  Lesotho  Philippines  Uruguay 
China Guinea-Bissau  Luxembourg  Portugal  United  States 
of America 
Cote d’Ivoire  Equatorial 
Guinea 
Morocco Paraguay Venezuela 
Cameroon Greece  Madagascar  Romania  South  Africa 
Congo, 
Republic of 
Guatemala Mexico  Rwanda  Zambia 
Colombia Hong  Kong  Mali  Senegal  Zimbabwe 
Comoros Honduras  Mozambique  Spain   
Cape Verde  Indonesia  Mauritius  El Salvador   
 
   17
 
Table 2: OECD Countries included in the analysis
* 
 
Australia Finland  Italy  Netherlands  Sweden 
Austria France  Japan  Norway  Switzerland 
Belgium Greece  Korea  New  Zealand  Turkey 
Canada Ireland Luxembourg  Portugal  United 
Kingdom 
Denmark Iceland  Mexico  Spain  United  States 
* Of the 30 countries currently listed as members of the OECD, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary 




Table 3: Relative Trends in Income Inequality for the OECD countries with 
alternative degrees of Inequality Aversion 
 
Time Period  G(1.5) G(2)  G(2.5) σln(GDP) 
1960  .163 .253 .318 .547 
1970  .132 .205 .260 .472 
1980  .108 .174 .226 .418 
1990  .105 .169 .218 .385 




Table 4: Relative Trends in Income Inequality for the Full-Sample (N=98) 
with alternative degrees of Inequality Aversion 
 
Time Period  G(1.5) G(2)  G(2.5) σln(GDP) 
1960  .327 .483 .572 .928 
1970  .337 .503 .600 1.02 
1980  .336 .510 .612 1.08 
1990  .358 .538 .641 1.14 
2000  .370 .553 .659 1.22 
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Table 5: Income Convergence Dynamics for 25 OECD Countries: 1960-2000. 





































































** Denotes that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.   19
 
Table 6: Income Convergence Dynamics for the full sample of 98 countries: 1960-





































































** Denotes that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.   20
Table 7: Conditional Income Convergence Dynamics for the full sample of 98 






































































** Denotes that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.   21
 
Figure 1: 























No β-convergence, No σ-convergence, No Leapfrogging  
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Figure 5 
β-convergence, σ-divergence, Leapfrogging  
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Figure 6:Graphical Summary of the Evolution of Income Inequality among 
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Figure 7: Graphical Summary of the Evolution of Income Inequality among 
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